‘A strong, fair and inclusive national identity’: A viewpoint on the Scottish Government’s Outcome 13

Steve Reicher (School of Psychology, University of St Andrews), David McCrone (Institute of Governance, University of Edinburgh) and Nick Hopkins (School of Psychology, University of Dundee)
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1. Preamble

Since May 2007, the Scottish Government has identified 15 National Outcomes which will make Scotland ‘a better place to live and a more prosperous and successful country.’ Among these, Outcome 13 declares: ‘We take pride in a strong, fair and inclusive national identity.’ This could be taken as simply describing today’s Scotland as the Scottish Government see it. However, it is also a call to build Scotland into a country which is cohesive, fair and inclusive with people who prioritise the values of fairness and inclusion. In this paper we ask: first, whether such a goal is possible; second, where Scotland currently stands in relation to this aspiration; and, third, what can be done to make it happen.

This is a controversial area, and the arguments often become confused because of the way in which different protagonists use the key terms in different ways. ‘National identity’ in particular is among the most slippery of concepts. Sometimes it is used very generally to mean no more than what a particular nation is like. Thus, one could just as well speak of a ‘strong, fair and inclusive Scotland’ as of a ‘strong, fair and inclusive Scottish national identity’, in which case one would be making a statement about how social life in Scotland is currently organised. At other times, ‘identity’ has a much more specific meaning, referring to the ways in which people subjectively understand their place in the world, who they see as being ‘one of them’, who they see as different, and who they see as being against them. According to this approach, ‘Scottish identity’ is not an objective description of what Scotland is, but rather a psychological sense of ‘who we are’ and ‘what we value’, which governs the way we respond to what happens in the world and which shapes our aspirations.

Our position is framed by two core arguments. The first is that we need to take this psychological sense of identity seriously. Any attempt to make Scotland a more cohesive, fair and inclusive society will be shaped by the ways in which we understand the meanings of Scotland’s national identity. However while we shall concentrate on the understanding of Scottish identity itself, we shall also be concerned with the identities of other groups in Scotland. Using Scottish national identity as an example, we shall show that group identities determine who is more or less accepted as part of society and its institutions and also who has more or less authority within them.

Our second argument is that identity is neither fixed nor singular. People who identify with a group do not necessarily agree on what that group really values or stands for.

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Rather, group members may adopt different understandings of their group, some more inclusive and some more exclusive, some which value fairness more and others which value fairness less. Perhaps because of their own experiences (for example, of discrimination) some groups may be inclined towards more inclusive definitions of national identity than others. However, the key point is that in any society these different definitions of national identity jostle for priority as people seek to shape others' views about the nation's identity – who 'we' are and what 'we' care about. For example, national identity can be defined through the past, through long lines of descent and ancestry that deny belonging to those more recently arrived. This is sometimes referred to as an ‘ethnic’ definition of nationhood.

Equally, however, national identity can be defined through the future, through a commitment to the national cause which embraces all those who see Scotland as their home. This is a ‘civic’ definition of nationhood. Although useful in illustrating the different ways in which national belonging can be understood, this does not mean that we can simply categorise any nation as endorsing either an ‘ethnic’ or a ‘civic’ conception. In any nation both ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ versions of belonging may operate and be topics of dispute. Indeed, as we will see, arguments over these different versions of identity are worth paying attention to because they have consequences for how people are treated and the rights that they can claim.

Putting together these two arguments – the fact that our sense of ‘who we are’ matters for the society in which we live and the fact that this definition is always open to argument – it becomes clear that there is everything to play for. Because identity is both so consequential and also so flexible, it becomes one, if not the, critical site of intervention in shaping the type of society in which we live. Defining who we are is the key to determining how we live. We therefore need to examine how different definitions of identity are sustained and how we can intervene in order to ensure that both Scottish identity and identities in Scotland are defined in order to ensure that all people are included and treated fairly.

In order to substantiate these points, the paper is organised as follows. We start by addressing how the definition of identity matters. That is, how does the way in which we define ourselves impact on the ways in which we treat others? Following that, we consider what it means to have a strong, fair and inclusive national identity, and we defend the idea that these various elements can be compatible. Next, we look at the current state of the Scottish nation: to what degree is Scottish identity strong, fair and inclusive, and what does that mean for the treatment of equality groups? Lastly, we look at the ways in which Scottish identity – as well as the identities of groups and institutions in Scotland – can be made stronger, fairer
and more inclusive. All together, we provide a perspective on how to understand Outcome 13 and how to implement it.
2. Identity matters

Consider this experiment. Young Scots are approached by a researcher and asked to read a passage which purportedly summarises what Scots in general take as the criteria for being Scottish. For some, this provides what we have called an 'ethnic definition': to be Scottish is to be born in Scotland of Scottish parents. For others, it provides a 'civic definition': to be Scottish is an act of choice and of commitment. Then, as they leave the researcher's company, they see a young woman of Chinese origin wearing a Scotland football top. She is struggling by, carrying a pile of files on top of which is perched precariously a box of pens. She stumbles, the box falls to the floor and the pens are scattered about. How do the young Scots react?

In her appearance, the woman is ethnically non-Scottish, and those who have been exposed to the ethnic definition pick up relatively few pens. By her shirt, however, she is civically Scottish, and those who have been exposed to the civic definition pick up relatively more pens. This study suggests three things. First, there are many competing ways to define an identity and people are willing to accept different definitions. Second, the ways we draw the boundaries of our identity, define who is and who is not seen as 'one of us'. Third, whether we see someone as one of us or not affects how we behave towards them and whether they benefit from those various acts of civility which so shape our everyday experience.

But can we really draw such weighty and such general conclusions from so slender and so specific an example? Consider, then, an example from the other end of a spectrum of seriousness. In the history of the holocaust, one country, Bulgaria, stands out. Alone, of the countries under German sway, not a single Jew from the lands of Old Bulgaria was deported to the death camps. Twice the Germans tried, twice they were thwarted by massive counter-mobilisations. When one looks to the texts which appealed against the deportation orders, one thing stands out. The word 'Jew' is rarely used. Those under attack are characterised as a national minority. And when they are characterized explicitly, it is to stress their irreducibly Bulgarian nature: 'they speak and think in Bulgarian, [...] sing Bulgarian popular songs and tell Bulgarian stories'. Once the Jewish population was included as part of the national community, it become self-evident that they should be protected from attack.

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2 This is a recent, as yet unpublished study, conducted by Juliet Wakefield, Nick Hopkins, Clare Cockburn, Kaman Shek and Wendy van Rijswijk at the University of Dundee.

To the question ‘should we help them?’; we may or may not answer yes. However to ask ‘should we help us’ seems almost absurd. Of course we should. That is what being ‘us’ is all about.

These examples point to the fact that, if we want to understand how people treat others, it is necessary to understand how they define themselves. Thus far, our examples have focused on who we include in the definition of who ‘we’ are and how this impacts on acts of civility and solidarity. But the same general principle applies to the issue of what ‘we’ are. That is, what are the values, beliefs and norms which characterise our group identities? What does it actually mean to be Scottish, Bulgarian or any other nationality for that matter?

The values associated with any group identity are important and frame our interpretations of situations and the understanding of our interests. To illustrate this point, let us start with what, at first glance, might seem like a rather irrelevant example. It concerns a study involving female physical education (PE) students⁴. These students could think of themselves in terms of different groups and in the research we either stressed their identity as women or as PE students. The research focused on how this emphasis on one or the other group identity would impact on their evaluation of a series of ailments – from facial scarring to diseases that would make them abnormally vulnerable to impact injuries. When the students’ gender was made salient ailments such as facial scarring were rated as more serious than ailments making them vulnerable to impact injuries. However, when being a PE student was made salient these ratings were reversed. In effect, the judgments and priorities expressed by these women were determined by the values associated with whichever identity was made relevant: for gender, physical appearance trumps physical activity; for physical educationalists, physical activity trumps physical appearance. In more general terms, this research suggests: first, that we have multiple identities upon which we can draw to define ourselves; second, that different identities give rise to different sets of values, and third, that these different values shape what we care about and how we act. And this is true even when it comes to such basic phenomena as our physical health.

But now, to illustrate the relevance of these processes to the social world, let us return once more to the Bulgarian example. In the Bulgarian texts we examined there were other arguments that recruited support for Bulgaria’s Jews. Alongside an insistence that the potential deportees were a national minority was the claim

that Bulgarians are a people ‘endowed with humanity, justice, and compassion for all those who suffer’. Hence to abandon the Jewish population would mean Bulgarians would ‘lose their moral and spiritual uniqueness, their Slavic essence, their Bulgarian face’. Here, then, the value of compassion is invoked to determine how Bulgarians are impelled to treat others in general, and how they are impelled to oppose deportation in the specific circumstances. Once again, albeit on a different dimension, who we are determines how we treat others. Identity in its narrow sense of self-definition determines identity in its broader sense of the type of society in which we live.

Having addressed the impact of both who we are and what we are, it is important to look at a combination of the two. For while we can make a distinction between those who share our identity and those who do not, this is not to say that all those who are included in our group are regarded equally. All may be recognised as belonging, but some may be judged as better exemplifying the values and norms which characterise the group and make it unique. Moreover, this hierarchy of who best exemplifies the group can translate into a hierarchy of treatment. In a group where, say, intelligence is valued over honesty, people will be more likely to have influence, gain authority and be chosen as leaders to the extent that they are seen to be intelligent, but where honesty is the central value, so we will look for leaders who are primarily honest.

As we shall see, this principle is often of most significance in determining whether key sections of the population face inequalities or not. Take the experience of Scottish women, disabled people, gay and lesbian people. Everyone may agree that such people are unambiguously Scottish (by whatever criteria people choose). However, to the degree that the nation itself, or institutions within the nation, are defined through values of masculine heterosexual vigour (the Scotland of beef and porridge oats adverts) it follows that some Scots are regarded as less able to represent ‘us’ (the national community) and thus may be overlooked in favour of others.

There is one final twist to this part of the tale. Just as there may be competing definitions of the boundaries of a given group (ethnic versus civic definitions of nationhood, for instance) so there can be competing definitions of the values of a given group and hence of who best exemplifies the group. For instance, the more you try to look for the values that constitute Scottishness, the more the sense that there does not seem to be a common core waiting to be uncovered becomes

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5 Dimo Kazasov, cited in Todorov, op cit p.59
apparent\textsuperscript{7}. Do Scots value independence and self-reliance, or do they value interdependence and community? Are we an inherently entrepreneurial people or else an inherently collectivistic people? Rather than seeking to provide an answer, it is better to change the question. That is, rather than asking what our identity really is, we should be asking how different definitions of identity affect our understandings of who we are and how we treat each other. We should see identity as a tool for shaping society rather than simply as a description of society. The advantage of such an approach is that it helps us understand how to intervene in order to make the world we want rather than leaving us helpless observers of the world as it is.

3. **A strong, fair and inclusive identity?**

We have discussed the notion of identity and why it matters for the way we treat others and the type of society we live in. We are now in a position to investigate more directly the idea of a strong, fair and inclusive Scottish identity – what it means and whether such a thing could ever be achieved. Let us consider each term in turn before considering them all together.

A **strong** identity refers to the importance that a group identity has for the relevant population, and the extent to which people habitually define themselves in terms of this identity. To what extent, then, do Scottish people care about being Scottish and look at the world through the prism of their Scottishness? The strength of identity is important in two regards. First, only to the extent that a set of people all think of themselves in terms of a common identity will they cohere and work together as a group. Second, only when group identity is strong will people orient to the way the group is defined – its boundaries and its values. Why care at all about who is Scottish and what Scottishness means unless you think about yourself as Scottish?

A **fair** identity is a statement that refers to the definition of what we are. To what extent is fairness seen as one of the key values which characterises what it means to be Scottish and which therefore governs the way we treat others whether they are Scottish or not. Conversely – and by analogy with the Bulgarian example above – to what extent would Scots lose their identity, betray their heritage and lose their Caledonian uniqueness by treating others unfairly? That is, to what extent would a failure of fairness be an injury against ourselves as well as against others?

Last, an **inclusive** identity is a statement that refers to the definition of who we are. To what extent do we define the boundaries of national belonging in terms that allow the entire population the right to be Scottish? Or else do we erect boundaries that make it impossible for people to be part of the nation? The issue here is not whether identity is conditional or not. In the end any identity always has some sort of conditions. Nor is it whether people have identity denied them or thrust upon them. It comes down to whether the conditions of nationhood are open to all and hence whether people can opt to be Scottish or not.

So, the big question – the controversial question – is whether in practice (and taking account of human psychology) an identity that is strong can also be fair and inclusive. Some very influential voices suggest not. In the United States, Robert Putnam has argued that an inclusive and diverse society comes at the cost of a strong and cohesive society. That is, the more ethnic minorities there are in an area,
the less trust, the less communal activity and the less interaction there will be in a community. This does not necessarily imply an ethnic view of national identity. However, it does imply that diversity is problematic and undermines cohesion. In the UK, David Goodhart has gone further and argued that the only way to ensure social cohesion, collective contribution and support for welfare provision is to make it harder for migrants to become part of the nation and even to introduce ‘second-class citizenship’ whereby migrant workers would be allowed employment but not benefits such as the health service. Again, this implies that diversity is a problem.

There have been many critiques of these arguments. Some have challenged the evidence, arguing, for instance, that if other factors are taken into account, diversity actually increases cohesion. Others have argued that they generalise from a rather parochial basis. Goodhart, for instance, premises his argument on the assumption that debates over national identity are organised around the issue of migration – which might be true to some extent in England but is far less applicable in Scotland. For us, however, there is a more fundamental problem in these arguments and the psychology that underlies them. That is, Goodhart in particular presupposes that people who identify more strongly with a group will be more reticent in allowing people to join the group. What is more, insofar as he also tends to assume that nations are defined ethnically, he presupposes that those who identify with a nation will be more rejecting of ‘ethnic others’. But this view ignores all the evidence that the way group identities impact on us depends upon the ways in which we define the group.

Evidence taken from over 30 countries shows that, in countries where popular opinion tends towards an ethnic definition of nationhood, higher national identification is associated with stronger anti-immigrant sentiments. Where a civic definition prevails, there is no such relationship. However, it is important to remember that there is much variation within the nation as to how different criteria are weighted, and this may have an impact on how immigrants are treated. For example one study in England showed that only among those who subscribe to an

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ethnic notion of nationhood\textsuperscript{12} was there a relationship between greater national identification and prejudice against immigrants.

In other words, the relationship between group identification and inclusiveness and/or fairness depends upon the way group identity is defined. In more everyday terms, it is certainly true that the more you care about being a member of a club, the more stringent you will be in applying the rules of membership to would-be applicants. However whether that makes you reject more people or less, and who it leads you to reject will entirely depend upon what club and what rules. Someone who passionately adheres to a nation and who passionately upholds the idea that their country is marked by giving succour to the tired and hungry masses is likely to be more passionate than most in welcoming migrants.

In effect we return to a point that we made at the start of this section. That is, the strength of identity is not of importance in isolation. Rather, it is the condition which makes definitions of who we are and what we are of consequence to how we treat others. Thus the terms ‘strong, fair and inclusive’, as they relate to identity, are neither necessarily incompatible nor inherently compatible. To put the point slightly differently, whether they are compatible or not lies not in our psychological make-up but rather in the cultural content we give to our group memberships. Our nature does not limit us but puts the responsibility in our own hands.

4. The state of the nation

What, then, is the current position in Scotland? How near or far are we from the Scottish Government’s aspiration to a strong fair and inclusive Scottish identity? As in the previous section, let us consider each term in turn.

It should be clear by now that issues of identity are rarely as straightforward as they might, at first, appear. As Willie McIlvanney has written: ‘Having a national identity is a bit like having an old insurance policy. You know you’ve got one somewhere but you’re not sure where it is. And if you’re honest, you would have to admit you’re pretty vague about what the small print means’\(^\text{13}\). However in this world, which is generally so full of uncertainty and contingency, we can give a simple answer to the question ‘do Scots have a strong identity’? Yes they do, by whatever measure one chooses. Since the questions were first asked in the 1980s up until the latest Scottish Social Attitudes survey in 2009, Scots consistently say that their national identity matters to them (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National identity of people born and living in Scotland: Percentage identifying as Scottish, Scottish and British, and British, by year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The corresponding figures for people born and living in England and identifying as English, English and British, British are in brackets.*

*Source: Scottish Social Attitudes surveys.*

Being Scottish certainly matters more than Britishness. The 2009 figures show that two thirds of Scots (67 per cent) describe themselves as mainly or only Scottish, while only 4 per cent say that they are only or mainly British. In England the figures

\(^{13}\) Willie McIlvanney, writing in The Herald, 6 March 1999.
are 35 per cent and 16 per cent respectively. Being Scottish matters more than social class (30 per cent), more than gender (28 per cent), and even more than being a wife/husband/partner (41 per cent) (see Table 2).

Table 2: Social identities: Percentage choosing stated identity as first, second or third choices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Scotland 2009</th>
<th>England 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parent</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working person</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working class</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish/English</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 2009.

So, to repeat, Scots have a strong identity. Which, as we have explained at some length, means to say that it matters whether Scottish identity is defined as fair and as inclusive. But here we return to the more familiar muddied ground. On fairness, Scots like to think of themselves as an open and egalitarian people, and this is exemplified in the degree to which Scottish idioms such as ‘a man’s a man for a’ that’ and ‘we’re a’ Jock Tamson’s bairns’ refer to a sense of common humanity regardless of social hierarchy. Lest this be thought anachronistic, a newspaper article which appeared on the day that this paper was written asserted that ‘race issues play differently in Scotland [than England]’ and that this is due to an inherent ‘love of diversity and a preferential option for those fleeing persecution’\(^\text{14}\). Again, the image is of a Scottish tradition of recognising our common humanity.

There is some systematic evidence to support these views\(^\text{15}\). For instance, the more people identify themselves as Scots the more they are at the liberal end of an authoritarian-liberal scale. With regards to social policies designed to redress inequalities, only six per cent of Scots thought that equal opportunities for women

\(^{14}\) Kevin McKenna in The Observer, 2 May 2010.

\(^{15}\) The following evidence is taken from the 2006 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, the last one to address these issues.
had gone too far as opposed to 35 per cent who thought they had not gone far enough – and, again, the more strongly they identified as Scots, the more they wanted things to go further (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1:** Opinions on policies designed to improve opportunities for women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gone too far</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not far enough</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About right</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, when it comes to ethnic minorities and gay men and lesbians, the picture is more complicated. With regard to social policies designed to improve opportunities for ethnic minorities, people’s opinions on whether policies have gone too far or not far enough are equally balanced, at 26 per cent and 25 per cent (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2:** Opinions on policies designed to improve opportunities for ethnic minorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gone too far</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not far enough</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About right</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Opinion is also pretty much equally balanced on whether social policies designed to improve opportunities for gay men and lesbians have gone too far or not far enough (see Figure 3).

**Figure 3:** Opinions on policies designed to improve opportunities for gay men and lesbians

![Bar chart showing opinions on policies for gay men and lesbians]

Taking these data together suggests something of a mixed bag. In some areas, such as policies focusing on gender, there is evidence that Scots value fairness and inclusiveness. However, in others, such as policies focusing on ethnicity and sexual orientation, it appears that Scots may not value fairness and inclusiveness to the extent that they themselves often like to think.

Being aware of how a group sees itself (for example, as fair and inclusive) in contrast to a more complex reality in which inequalities remain, may serve as a stimulus for further change. To put it another way, challenging a group’s image of itself as fair-minded can be a powerful basis for bringing reality into closer accord with people’s idealised self-conception. However, much depends on just how aware people actually are of the contrasts between their own self-conceptions as tolerant and the reality of intolerance. For example, when Scottish fairness and tolerance is lauded, it is often in a contrast with England and this can create a sense of pride that limits awareness of the scale of Scotland’s own problems. There is evidence, for instance, that when Scots judge Scotland alongside England, racism is seen to be a minor problem at home. But when people judge Scotland alongside Scandinavia and other Northern European countries, racism is seen as a considerably more significant
issue. More worryingly, perhaps, the sense that racism is a minor problem was accompanied by the view that measures against racism are of low priority.

The key question, then, is whether the popular self-perception of Scotland as a tolerant nation is a source of complacency or else an aspiration through which people can be galvanised and held to account. How do we ensure Scottish self-perceptions of tolerance become a guide to action rather than an excuse for inaction? In short, how do we ensure that identity is treated as a verb (what we do) rather than a noun (what we are)?

Turning now to the issue of inclusiveness, we find an equally complex picture. Again, when it comes to what Scots say of themselves, there is some very attractive discourse. Alex Salmond, for instance, has provided an eloquent and classic statement of civic nationhood: ‘Our ambition is to see the cause of Scotland argued with English, French, Irish, Indian, Pakistani, Chinese and every other accent in the rich tapestry of what we should be proud to call, in the words of Willie McIlvanney, “the mongrel nation of Scotland”.’ Equally, there is evidence that suggests many Scots see residence as ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ important as a criteria for being Scottish. Yet as Table 3 shows, one’s place of birth and one’s ancestry also count.

### Table 3: Criteria for being Scottish (1997): Percentage per importance level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Birth</th>
<th>Ancestry</th>
<th>Residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly important</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very important</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all important</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


More recent survey data confirms this complex mix of criteria. Most Scots (65 per cent) see residence as a very or fairly important determinant of Scottishness.

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17 From the 2009 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey.
However, birthplace (82 per cent) and ancestry (73 per cent) are also very important markers of Scottishness, with other studies showing that birthplace is seen by a clear majority of indigenous Scots (64 per cent) as not only important but as an essential criterion of Scottishness\textsuperscript{18}.

In short, we can see that there are different ways of being taken for Scottish, and our own investigations reflect this complexity. When people claim to be Scottish, they do so both on the basis of their Scottish descent and also on the basis of tying their destiny to Scotland\textsuperscript{19}. Equally, when people assess these claims, they see someone as more Scottish both if they have Scottish ancestry and if they display commitment to the country. Even when we try to pit one definition against the other, seeing if someone who shows commitment is seen as more or less Scottish than someone who is born and bred Scottish, the outcome varies. For instance, if we ask the question in general terms, birth tends to take precedence. However, if people have to assess the claim of a specific individual to Scottishness, birth and commitment are taken equally seriously\textsuperscript{20}. So, once more, it is misleading to assume that there is a clear consensus on the criteria for being accepted as Scottish. People routinely refer to a mix of criteria – some more ‘ethnic’ and some more ‘civic’.

So, just like a bar of soap, the more we try to capture what really determines being Scottish, both whether we value fairness and whether we are inclusive, the more it slips from our grasp. This suggests that we are approaching the issue in the wrong way. Rather than trying to reconcile all the contradictory evidence, it might be better to say that there are multiple formulations of Scottishness that are in circulation. Some emphasise fairness (and action against unfairness) more than others. Some define national belonging based on ancestry; some are based on place; some are based on one’s chosen destiny. In short, being Scottish can be as much about ‘routes’ as about ‘roots’.

But to leave things at that would be highly unsatisfactory. What makes the argument significant and consequential is that identities are never settled, never made for once and for always. Identities are constantly in the process of being made and remade, building upon, reinterpreting and transforming what went before. From this more dynamic perspective, the different existing formulations of Scottishness become resources that can be drawn upon in the remaking of Scottishness – and they are

\textsuperscript{20} This is unpublished work by Nick Hopkins, Stephen Reicher and Wendy van Rijswijk.
all the more powerful for their familiarity. Our description of how Scottishness is currently understood shows that there is still work to be done in terms of developing an identity capable of forging a fairer and more inclusive Scotland. But, perhaps more importantly, it identifies the opportunities that we have for shaping a vision of Scottish identity in which the values of fairness and inclusiveness are brought to the fore. As we have seen, there are a number of elements to Scots’ self-conception that can help in this regard. However, if these are to take prominence, we need to consider the contexts and practices where visions of Scottish identity are produced and disseminated, and the steps we can take to shape those visions. Only through shaping people’s conceptions of their national identity will we be able to bring into being a fairer and more inclusive Scottish reality.
5. Making a strong, fair and inclusive Scottish identity

We can identify three dimensions through which our sense of identity is created. The first has to do with rhetoric, by which we mean what people say in their speeches and what is written in textbooks. The second has to do with material culture, by which we mean both those artefacts which tell us who we are, where we have come from and where we are going (for instance the statues and monuments which populate our landscape and the museums which tell our story) and also the commemorations and celebrations and ceremonies in which we come together to mark our collective being. The third has to do with institutional structures and practices (both formal and informal) which shape our experience of the organisations that constitute a significant element of Scottish society.

As we consider each of these dimensions in more detail, we will continue to address the nature of Scottish identity. But this should be seen as a template for how identities more generally are made in Scotland. For the fairness and inclusiveness of our society do not only depend on Scottish identity itself. They also depend on the identities of communities and organisations within Scotland and how different sections of the population are made more or less marginal within them. Hence, especially in our discussion of institutions, we will explicitly look at the implications at all levels of society.

At the rhetorical level, we have already provided an example of inclusive rhetoric from Alex Salmond, himself quoting Willie McIlvanney’s notion of ‘the mongrel nation of Scotland’ – a lovely image which rejects the notion of the ‘pure breed’ and defines identity as coming through the inter-mixing of different strands. Another image which conveys a similarly inclusive message (and which was sketched by another Scottish National Party MP), portrays Scotland as a tartan in which ‘so many different, very brightly coloured parts of the whole merge together as a pattern’[21].

Such statements are important, but they are one-offs. Equally, there are powerful examples of fairness rhetoric. For instance, it is notable that the Scottish Government campaign against discrimination (One Scotland, Many Cultures) centred on the argument that such behaviour is at odds with what it means to be Scottish (Scotland, No Place for Racism)[22]. But again, these are relatively short-term

[22] For examples of some of the campaign materials, see http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Img/918/0049178.gif (poster, accessed 26/10/2010) or http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iJzUx5CEOJc (video).
campaigns. By contrast, those texts which are read by everyone and which are studied over extended periods – school textbooks are the obvious example – might reasonably be expected to have a more enduring impact upon us. What sorts of story do they tell? Do they portray Scottish history as that of a sovereign people moving through time or as a set of encounters and of minglings in which the people is continuously recreated? What heroes do they highlight? Powerful individuals substituting for the community or a diversity of groups coming together to claim their rights? Who is included or excluded? What values are prioritised? Who represents the nation and who remains in their shadow? No history can avoid making a choice on these matters. No sustained attempt to create a fair and inclusive Scotland can avoid intervening in the telling of national history.

History, though, does not only exist in speeches and books. As we have already noted, our history and our heroes are all around us in the physical landscape. They are in street names and in statues and in museums. Again, there are some excellent examples of inclusive and egalitarian practice. To take one example, the Verdant Works in Dundee tells the history of Jute in Dundee as an encounter between oil from the local whaling industry and fibre from the Indian subcontinent which created an entirely new product. It documents the rise of a female workforce, of women trade unionists and the transformation of women’s place in society. But, publicly, Dundee remains the City of the heroic Captain Scott and of his ship, Discovery.

We know of no systematic audit on who is celebrated in the statues and monuments of Scotland, but casual observation suggests that it is the usual cast of dead white males. We do not suggest that changing that cast would somehow change the self-understanding of Scots in and of itself. However, there are two more nuanced ways in which addressing the inclusivity of our material cultures of nationhood could be of importance. First, the very act of calling for change and of mobilising to erect a new and more diverse statuary would raise debate about who we are and whose contributions have been undervalued. Second, once built, statues and monuments provide a focus around which it is possible to organise further mobilisations in support of inclusivity and fairness. Statues of women, of gay people, of ethnic

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minorities are statements which facilitate further statements in favour of inclusion and rights. These arguments take us to other aspects of our material culture: those collective events which mark our identity and play such an important part in communicating both to ourselves and to others who and what we are. How are these events organised? Who is invited and who is forgotten? Who is given pride of place and who is ignored? Either deliberately or (quite often) inadvertently, these events which are meant to bring people together and value them equally can create division and inequality. Consider, for instance, two events through which the Scottish Government has sought to affirm and celebrate a sense of Scottishness. One, the Homecoming, defines as Scottish those who are linked to Scotland by descent. You don’t have to have been born in Scotland, you don’t need to know anything about Scotland, you don’t need ever to have visited Scotland, but the fact that your ancestors may have left many generations back is sufficient for Scotland to be your home. It is quite understandable that this has its attractions for tourist and international business purposes. But it can also send other messages. Take for example, a first or second generation immigrant to Scotland who, because of their commitment to Scotland, feels thoroughly Scottish. How would such a person interpret the message that others with nothing more than ancestral links to Scotland have a Scottish ‘home’? It would be perfectly understandable if they wondered if such a celebration of ancestry implied an ethnic conception of belonging and that their own sense of Scottishness was unlikely to be recognised as valid.

The other, St Andrew’s Day, defines Scotland through association with an ancient Christian saint. What does this say to those who are of other religions or else of no religion at all? For instance, when asked, a sample of Scottish Jews expressed a strong sense of Scottishness and also a sense of being accepted fully as Scots by others. Yet they did have some residual concerns, one of which was the implication of equating Scottishness with St Andrew.

Our point here is not that St Andrew’s Day should be scrapped or that one should not appeal to descendants of Scottish emigrants. It is, however, that if the desire to

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25 For a powerful historical example of the role of monuments in building social movements (specifically, how the Bismarck towers in Germany, and the annual pilgrimages to these towers on his birthday, helped build a Germany along Bismarckian principles), see Frankel, R. (2004) Bismarck’s Shadow. Oxford: Berg.


27 This is a recent, as yet unpublished, piece of work by Amit Mander and Stephen Reicher at the University of St Andrews.
create an inclusive and tolerant society is meant seriously, it cannot simply be tacked on as one in a long list of concerns. Rather, it must be a prism through which we interrogate all of our social and cultural practices, from the naming of buildings and streets to the planning of national events.

To this list we must add as perhaps the most important element, the nature of our institutional practices. In the same way that an explicit discourse of national inclusion may be subverted by practices which marginalise or even exclude certain groups, so we need to analyse how institutional practices embody particular values and serve to privilege some over others. What makes these practices so significant is, first, that they are not exceptions that occur perhaps once a year, but rather they are the stuff of everyday life. Second, they are relevant not only to national institutions but to every institution in the nation whether in the private sector, the public sector or the third sector. And, when we talk of practices, we are not only talking of formal rules and regulations but also the informal and social activities that surround working activities. Do work days out, for instance, require activities that exclude those with disabilities? Are the types of activity gendered – watching or participating in sports, say? Do they revolve around forms of customary behaviour – such as drinking – which are at odds with the requirements of certain religions? Each example may seem rather trivial, but together they can amount to a clear system of what sorts of behaviour and what sorts of people do and do not belong here.

We are not suggesting that such exclusive practices are deliberate, or even that they have been thought through. Often they are taken for granted, things have always been done that way – they endure and are legitimised under the rubric of tradition. That may reduce culpability for the practice, but it increases its insidiousness and resilience. Accordingly, we suggest that any comprehensive and effective commitment to a fair and inclusive society must, as a priority, undertake a comprehensive analysis of how institutional practices serve to define group boundaries and group norms, and how this in turn reflects on the position of different sections of the population – what we term an ‘institutional identity audit’.

To finish our analysis, it is important to explain how this idea relates to public sector duties, which place a legal obligation on all public bodies not merely to avoid discrimination but actively to promote services which develop equality in order to meet the needs of different groups. What we provide is a general analysis of the bases of fairness/unfairness and inclusion/exclusion which may help us better understand these issues.

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understand how institutional practices can produce exclusion and inequality. This tells us a) where institutions need to focus, and b) how they need to act in order to achieve inclusion and equality. That is, we show how – in addition to those policies that directly advantage some over others – institutional practices define the group identity and so shape those multiple small everyday acts of recognition and civility which tell people who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’, and which so affect our experience of institutional life. In short, identity practices underlie the creation (or dismantling) of a culture of exclusion.

The culture of exclusion is something far more subtle and tenacious than explicit acts of discrimination. One reason for this has to do with the multiple levels at which identity processes work. To be accepted in a group depends not only on our desire to be included, nor only on the willingness of others to include us, it also depends upon our belief that we will be included by others. What institutional practices can do, even where majority and minority wish to be inclusive, is lead certain sections of the population to believe that they are unwanted or seen as marginal. This can lead people to self-select out, and can further entrench inequality through encouraging those within the institution to explain the problem as lying ‘out there’ in ‘them’ rather than ‘in here’ in ‘us’.

One of the most important elements of institutional identity audits, then (and one of the ways in which it would build on existing policy requirements) is drawing explicit attention to how an institution can subtly advertise itself to non-members in ways which may lead to some people concluding that ‘it is not for us’ – even if, in its explicit discourse, the institution may proclaim ‘we are open to all’. This process can help ensure that institutions are truly welcoming, and seen to be welcoming, by all sections of our society.
6. Conclusion

How then should we approach the aspiration to develop a ‘strong, fair and inclusive Scottish identity’? By now, our viewpoint should be clear and it involves four key claims.

First, we argue that an understanding of identity, identity processes and identity construction is critical to understanding how to create a strong, fair and inclusive identity.

Second, we argue that strong, fair and inclusive identities are not impossible dreams but rather depend upon how we construct their meanings.

Third, we show that Scottish identity is indeed strong, but that there are multiple and contradictory strands when it comes to fairness and inclusiveness. The key point, however, is that rather than asking what these contradictory strands mean for what Scottish identity ‘really’ is, we should focus on how such different strands affect our understandings of who we are and how we treat each other. That is, we should see identity as a tool for shaping society and intervene so as to support and extend those visions of national identity that promote the values of fairness and inclusivity celebrated in Outcome 13.

Fourth, we argue that making Scottish identity (and hence Scottish society) fairer and more inclusive depends upon a systematic programme of action that would interrogate the way identity is defined through our public discourse and educational texts, the ways we mark and celebrate our national story, and the practices of all our institutions.

This would, we recognise, be an enormous task. But our fundamental point is that it can be done. We can no longer hide behind the distorted psychological assumption that human nature condemns us to inequality. We can, of course, decide that equality is not a high enough priority to justify the efforts needed to achieve it. We might decide that it is too expensive to be justified. But if we decide otherwise, then the tools for change are available. Ultimately, the choice between inequality and equality lies in our hands.
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www.equalityhumanrights.com
National identity is a critical area of debate in both policy and everyday life in Scotland. The Scottish Government’s current National Performance Framework has identified as one of their 15 National Outcomes: to take pride in a strong, fair and inclusive national identity.

This report offers a contribution to better understand this notion of a strong, fair and inclusive national identity in order to stimulate debate and help ensure that policies to promote a strong, fair and inclusive identity are built on a sound understanding of the issues. As identity is a concept that can be shaped and changed, it offers a critical site of intervention in shaping the type of society in which we live. This report explores the degree to which Scottish identity is strong, fair and inclusive, and what this means for equality groups. It then looks at the ways in which Scottish identity – as well as the identities of groups and institutions in Scotland – can be made stronger, fairer and more inclusive. All together, the report provides a perspective on how to understand the Scottish Government’s National Outcome and how to implement it.